War (1618-48). In 1638, the same year his account of Fort Mystic appeared, Vincent published Lamentations of Germany. So far "beyond all precedent of former ages" had Germany regressed in prosecuting its war that Vincent felt compelled to devote his entire work to detailing its horrors-complete with graphic illustrations of torture, rape, and famine-so that civilized peoples might fully understand the consequences of violating the rules of war. To Vincent, those rules had been admirably observed in the Pequot conflict. Unlike the combatants in Germany, who killed all of their captives, Christian or not, the Puritans allowed most of their prisoners to live. Vincent also justified the offensive by highlighting its utilitarian benefits. New England Puritans were "assured of their peace by killing the Barbarians. . . . For having once terrified them, by severe execution of just revenge, they shall never heare of more harme from them." Not only had the war proven effective against the Pequots, but it had also sent a message to the Mohawks, a group Vincent considered "cruell bloodie Caniballs."5 Although Vincent's pejorative descriptions of Indians would today brand him a racist, he was actually quite cognizant of their humanity as of "the same constitution, & the sons of Adam, and that we had the same Maker, the same matter, the same mould. Only Art and Grace have given us that perfection, which yet they want, but may perhaps be as capable thereof as we."6 Rather, it was precisely because they could be viewed as equals, in a sense-equals simply in need of correction and "civilization"-that the Indians could be held to the rules of war.
Under conventions of international law well known and understood by Englishmen, especially professional soldiers like Puritan military leader John Mason, the Puritans felt fully justified in their actions against the Pequots, for a town or fort refusing to surrender required little, if any, protection.7 In the words of historian Maurice Keen, "In a city taken by storm almost any license was condoned by the law. Only churches and churchmen were technically secure, but even they were not often spared. Women could be raped, and men killed out of hand."8 Thus, setting fire to a village and granting quarter to many of the captives, as the Puritans did, was well within the bounds of law and supported by English conceptions of religion and morality, even had the opponents been Christian.
Instead of dismissing the Indians as racially or culturally inferior, Puritans debated the extent to which the "laws of nations" applied to them.9 Forty years after the Pequot conflict, William Hubbard wrote in his history of King Philip's War that the 1637 attack on the Pequot was justified because they had acted "contrary to the Laws of Nature and Nations."'0 Such language differs from that used during King Philip's War, which refers to the hostilities as a rebellion or insurrection."l In 1637 the Puritans considered the Pequot outside their polity. Before the conflict, English patents and charters never granted Puritans formal title to Indian lands; not until they understood themselves as having conquered a sovereign nation in a just war did the Puritans believe they had earned that right. '2Throughout the essay I use the terms "colonials" or "colonialists" to refer to the groups-both Puritan and Indian-that fought to put down the rebellion, and I refer to the Indians allied with Philip as "political separatists," "separatists," or "revolutionaries." I am departing from the tradition of simply labeling the opposing forces as the "English" (or "Puritans") and the "Indians" because the false dichotomy it imposes perpetuates a Puritan, anglocentric view of an "Indian war" or a "war against the Indians" and neglects certain important facts, e.g., that on a per capita basis, more Indian than Puritan soldiers fought to put down the rebellion. I have also avoided adjectives such as "anglophile" to describe those Indians, because the term suggests that they were fighting to advance English interests more so than their own. By calling groups such as the Mohegan "colonialists," I do not intend to imply that they favored English expansionism and extraction of raw materials from the "periphery" to the "core" along the lines implied by a world systems model. Instead, these groups simply saw enough political advantages in siding with the colonies that they opted to continue their formal submission to them.
'3Edward Coke, The Conduct during King Philip's War followed a similar pattern. New English forces tended to exact stricter punishments as time progressed and the confidence of victory grew stronger.'6 Harsher penalties were also tied to the duration of the conflict, which was quickly emptying New England coffers. Selling surrendered Indians as slaves, a practice the Puritans felt they could justify through Scripture and international law, provided much needed revenue. As the war came to a close and the number of surrendered and captured Indians increased, executions and enslavement were also more noticeable. Separating out and weighing these three burdens of causation is probably impossible, given the difficulty of determining exactly how combatants behaved in the field; nevertheless, it does seem clear that a stricter application of legal penalties corresponded with a strong profit incentive and a large population of uprooted Indians who had to be dealt with in some reasonable fashion.
Separatist Indians fell into one of several categories: separatist leaders, or "Grand Contrivers," such as prominent sachems, whom the Puritans executed; more ordinary separatists who killed colonials in an "unsoldierly fashion" and faced trial for murder and, if convicted, execution; separatists who Their confessions and the accusation of an "Indian squa" prompted the Court to condemn the three to death, the rationale being that forasmuch as the councell had before this engaged to seuerall Indians, desirous to come in and tender themselues to mercye, that they should find fauor in soe doeing, it was fully made knowne to such Indians as were then psent that the said engagement was to be vnderstood with exception against such as by murder as abouesaid had soe acted, and not against such as killed his enimie in the feild in a souldier like way.'7 These Indians, not operating within the bounds of military conduct as traditionally defined, were thus held accountable in a civil court for having committed a crime against humanity. Having demonstrated no restraint and no mercy, they deserved none. The immunities reserved for prisoners of war did not apply to these three, who were scrupulously distinguished from the others who had surrendered.
Just The separatist Indian leader Annawon was among those captured by Church's colonialist forces. With specific orders in his commission restricting his treatment of captives, Church relayed to them verbatim that he could "treaty and composition to receive to mercy, if [he] see reason (provided they be not Murderous Rogues, or such as have been principal Actors in those Villanies)." He was generous with his mercy insofar as he was able. He informed the captives that "their lives should all be spared, excepting Captain Annawon's and it was not in his power to promise him his life, but he must carry him to his masters at Plymouth, and he would entreat them for his life."22 The leaders at Plymouth were not moved; Annawon was beheaded.
The magistrates of Massachusetts held that colony's captives to even harsher standards. When called to decide the fate of some captured Indian separatists in September 1676, the Court decided that "such of them as shall appeare to have imbrued their hands in English blood should suffer death here, and not be transported into forreigne parts."23 Such a judgment followed the dictates of a civil rather than a military jurisdiction, as captives increasingly faced charges of murder and treason rather than receiving the immunities accorded a soldier who killed during wartime. The record is silent about Massachusetts' shift in policy, but we can theorize that colonialists had a sense of certain victory in September that, Philip now dead, they had lacked in July. With the death of Philip, whose symbolic importance was perhaps as significant as his strategic skills, Puritan settlers undoubtedly felt they had less to fear by treating the captives harshly. A kind of vengeance that was not permissible in a military setting could find its place in a civil one.
Rhode Island, which had remained neutral in the war, was inundated with Indian refugees who had fled the United Colonies in search of leniency. As in the other colonies, the Rhode Island Of course, laws and morality are rarely, if ever, immutable principles, and prevailing conditions are seldom disregarded. The Puritans, no one will be surprised to learn, had practical concerns that influenced their interpretation of events and the character of their justice. Because morality and utility differed across time and space in the conduct and aftermath of King Philip's War, the degree to which the colonialists followed formally prescribed codes varied from case to case. Yet this variation followed patterns.
Social position was one of many determinants influencing conduct. Military leaders with formal training and government officials tended to show restraint in their punishment of separatists and to attempt to differentiate among them according to degrees of guilt. English colonialists of the "lower sort," on the other hand-Puritan volunteers, civilians, and those English combatants without formal military training-tended to execute Indians simply for who they were. They despised all Indi- Moseley's atrocities not only infuriated friends of the praying Indians, like Gookin; they also created problems for colonial officials who had to make amends for his actions. The correspondence of John Pynchon also speaks to the common hysteria for revenge that could frustrate a pragmatic approach to avoiding skirmishes with the separatists. Pynchon, like Gookin, emphasized the need to court potential Indian allies. Yet in the town of Springfield, of which Pynchon was the most powerful citizen, large numbers of English distrusted the very Indians Pynchon most valued.36 Championing the rights of a Northampton Indian accused on weak evidence of joining the separatists, Pynchon wrote Connecticut Governor John Winthrop, Jr., of his dismay that his point of view was universally disdained.
Sir, people cry out that he is not dispatched; I wonder at such a spirit in people for our most faithful Indians tell me they cannot think but that he was coming in from his hunting wigwam to the English out of dislike of the enemy, he having a father, mother, wife, and children at Northampton.... I am said to be overfavorable.37
Apparently many of Springfield's English inhabitants were prepared to disregard the protections afforded a prisoner of war and even the due process reserved for a civilian traitor. The discrepancy between their point of view and Pynchon's demonstrates that social position affected one's willingness to impose customary restraints on violence.
Whatever their personal regard for particular Indians or groups of Indians, both Gookin and Pynchon offered utilitarian arguments for restraining violence in an era of war. They were not alone. Utilitarian concerns emerged again and again, whether explicitly or implicitly, as a rationale for regulating behavior. Separatists, too, the colonialists thought, had tried to limit atrocities, and so opponents had a sense of sharing mutually reinforcing codes of conduct. Atrocities, or at least alleged atrocities, in the Irish Rebellion of 1641 and in the Thirty Years War provided a background against which Puritans judged Indian actions as relatively benign. Like any group engaged in war, the Puritans constructed a demonized enemy "other." Yet this "other" did not exist simply as a binary opposite of the self; rather, the Puritans recognized degrees of otherness. And separatist Indian conduct came much closer to Puritan norms than did that of Irish rebels in 1641.
Thirty-four years before King Philip's War, English presses had spewed forth graphic descriptions of atrocities Irish Catholics had allegedly committed against English Protestants. Acting much like the Germans in Philip Vincent's Lamentations of Germany, the Irish had supposedly subjected combatants and noncombatants alike to horrifying tortures, the most despicable of which, according to the pamphleteers, was the raping of women. Undoubtedly, the English press exaggerated, even fabricated, a large number of the atrocities it reported; nonetheless, the English perception that the Irish routinely raped Protestant women-that they were thus routinely committing war crimes-was very real. among those all now considered savage or inhumane. Throughout King Philip's War, the Puritans would never reach that point with the Indians.
Even though Puritan writers frequently described the separatists as "barbarous" or "savage," many also acknowledged that the Indians generally accorded respect to their captives. As William Hubbard noted in 1677, "The Indians how barbarous soever in their own Nature, yet civilly intreated their Prisoners." After the raid on Lancaster, Massachusetts, for example, Hubbard asserted that the Indians did not "offer any uncivil Carriage to any of the Females, nor ever attempted the Chastity of any of them."42 Witnessing such behavior forced Puritans to reexamine their stereotypes of savage, lustful Indians to determine more precise motives for those atrocities separatists did commit.
Indian behaviors that may strike modern students of King Philip's War as horrific were often mutually practiced or are otherwise understandable within context. Bodies of dead colonials and their livestock were sometimes stripped, "mutilated," and their heads placed on poles.43 Mounting heads in such a fashion was not unique among the Indians; indeed, it was a familiar sight in seventeenth-century European conflicts, including the English Civil War, and both sides followed the practice in King Philip's War.44 Mutilation, of course, was an obvious re- In one case, some separatists who had surrendered to the English were placed among the Narragansett, whom they claimed as their kin. Petitioning the Massachusetts Court in June 1676 for leniency for their kin, whom they had captured, a group of praying Indians who had fought on the colonialist side advanced the utilitarian argument that such treatment might induce other Indians to surrender.50 Kinship ties among Indians also raised English suspicions. To assess the loyalty of their Indian allies, the English often forced them to be the punishers. Benjamin Church ordered one of his Indian soldiers to kill a captured kinsman with a hatchet blow to the head.5' Increase Mather had an even more clever rationale for commissioning Indian executioners when he wrote that upon the capture of the separatist sachem Canonchet, the English caused the Pequods and Monhegins, and Ninnegrets Indians to joyn together in shooting Quanonchet, and cutting off his head, which was sent to Hartford. And herein the English dealt wisely, for by this meanes, those three Indian Nations are to become abominable to the other Indians, and it is now their interest to be faithfull to the English, since their own Countrymen will never forgive them, on account of their taking and killing the Sachem mentioned.52
That Indians were often willing to carry out the sentence attested to their loyalty and the sincerity of their submission to English rule. the unique historical situation of 1675 and 1676, many colonialists saw the enslavement of separatist Indians as an opportunity both to dispense mercy and to reap a profit. Given their belief that separatists were rebels and traitors, colonialists maintained their right to execute prisoners. Yet many separatists whom the colonialists might have so treated under law did not face the executioner. In part, the majority of those surrendered or captured Indians not considered ringleaders were "spared" because, although they were taken to be subjects of the colonies, the English felt that they occupied a rung lower than themselves in a natural hierarchy.53 Thus Puritans often approached Indians paternalistically.
Although the level of violence in
The official symbol of the Massachusetts Bay Colony depicted an Indian entreating the English to "Come over and help us."' John Eliot, who took that plaintive request seriously, responded joyfully to Daniel Gookin's favorable Historical Account of the Christian Indians in New England: "As Natural fathers, so foster fathers, are well pleased to hear well of their children." Eliot, who thought of the New England Indians to whom he ministered as the "foster children" of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England, exemplified the beneficent aspect of a paternalism that also had its darker side.54
Nothing makes the Puritans' perception of Indians' inferiority more apparent than the mass selling of separatist Indians into slavery.55 Although it was considered acceptable for Christian victors to enslave Christian captives, in practice it was pri- Colonialist soldiers, both Indian and English, kept captives as payment for their services. Plymouth Colony allowed Benjamin Church's English forces to have "half the prisoners and arms" they took; his Indian force was granted only "the loose plunder."59 Connecticut treated its Indian troops more generously than did Plymouth. The colonialist Indian leader Ninigret received two separatist Indian children for his loyalty, and Uncas kept a number of his captives, including some of Philip's relatives.60 The colonies, struggling to pay for the war, found in the separatist captives a human goldmine.61 Financial incentives, combined with the formal rules of war, the subordinate status of Indians in New England society, the difficulties inherent in banishing Indians, the culture of discipline, and the shortage of labor all justified, in the Puritan mind, their sale into servitude or slavery. Slavery, in this particular historical context, seemed to many colonialists an especially benevolent, and rewarding, alternative to execution. Contextualizing Puritan actions in King Philip's War against the background of contemporaneous conflicts involving English Puritans reveals that their conduct in many respects paralleled that to be expected in a civil war more than in a conflict between sovereign powers or even a war between a civilized society and a savage other. This is not to say that the New England Puritans fought King Philip's War as a civil war "among brothers." They considered themselves more advanced in the natural hierarchy than their Indian opponents, and thus, keeping within the metaphors of kinship, they fought the war more as if it were a conflict between father and child. On the other hand, for the Indians on both sides of the conflict, it often was, in a literal as well as a figurative sense, a war among brothers.
For When Indian separatists challenged colonial rule in 1675, the English colonialists faced a wayward child. Although they never intended to exact the ultimate punishment for disobedience on all rebellious Indians, in effect the Puritans' restraint, limited and fragile at best, did little to prevent the collapse of New England's Indian population. In the end, the cultural gestalt of the colonialists allowed them to carry out effectively genocidal policies while steadfastly believing to the end that they stood upon the moral high ground. 
